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Medical Restrictive Covenants in Illinois:
at the Crossroads of Carter-Shields
and Prairie Eye Center
Stuart Gimbel and Miles J. Zaremski1
Medical restrictive covenants2 have enjoyed a unique legal
heritage under Illinois law.3 However, two recent appellate
court cases in Illinois have debated whether restrictive covenants of medical practitioners are unenforceable as violating Illinois' public policy. In Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Institute,4
the Fifth District Appellate Court ruled that, as a matter of law
and public policy, restrictive covenants are not enforceable
against medical practitioners. However, in Prairie Eye Center,
Ltd. v. Butler,5 the Fourth District Appellate Court expressly rejected the holding in Carter-Shields and held that medical restrictive covenants are not contrary to public policy and may be
enforced. Despite this conflict in the appellate districts, the Supreme Court of Illinois expressly avoided resolving the public
policy issue when it affirmed, in part, the ruling in Carter-Shields
on other grounds.6 Instead, the Supreme Court expressed "no
opinion with respect to the general validity of non-competition
1. Stuart Gimbel and Miles J. Zaremski are partners in the law firm of Kamensky
& Rubinstein in Lincolnwood, Illinois. Stuart Gimbel has a J.D. from the University
of Virginia School of Law (1986), and practices in the area of commercial litigation,
with an emphasis on restrictive covenant litigation. Mr. Gimbel can be contacted at
sgimbel@kr-law.com. Miles J. Zaremski has a J.D. from George Gund Hall, Case
Western Reserve Law School (1973), and practices in the area of commercial litigation and health law. Mr. Zaremski can be reached at mzaremski@kr-law.com. The
research, support, and overall assistance of Priscilla Dragoi, a law clerk with Kamensky & Rubinstein, is gratefully acknowledged.
2. For the purposes of this article, the term "restrictive covenant" will be used
interchangeably with the related terms "covenant not-to-compete" and "non-competition agreement."
3. Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("The
case law governing covenants not to compete in medical employment contracts has
developed separately from that applicable to other employment contracts and no special proof of entitlement to patients is required to find a protectable interest on the
part of the medical practice.").
4. Carter-Shields, 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (I11.
App. Ct. 2000).
5. Prairie Eye Ctr., 768 N.E.2d at 421.
6. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 2002 WL 31087256, at *37 (Ill. Sept. 19,
2002).
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clauses contained within physician employment agreements." 7
Accordingly, the question of whether restrictive covenants of
medical practitioners are enforceable in Illinois remains
unsettled.8
This article will review the legal precedent leading up to the
Carter-Shields and Prairie Eye Ctr. decisions, consider the reasoning of those conflicting decisions, and attempt to reconcile
those decisions in a manner consistent with Illinois precedent
and case law from other jurisdictions. In addition, this article
will analyze the public policy concerns fueling the debate over
the enforcement of medical practitioners' restrictive covenants.
Considering the public policy arguments that have been advanced against enforcement of medical restrictive covenants,
there are not sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court of Illinois to reverse its long history of enforcing the reasonable restrictive covenants of medical practitioners.9
I.

GENERAL RULES FOR ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS IN ILLINOIS.

Illinois courts have protected fair competition in business
while "exhibiting an abhorrence of restraints of trade." 10 Because restrictive covenants contained in employment agreements" act as partial restraints of trade, such covenants are
carefully scrutinized by Illinois courts.12 However, where neces7. Id.
8. Id. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated the portion of the CarterShields decision which found that medical restrictive covenants are contrary to public
policy, the public policy issues raised in Carter-Shields have not been conclusively
resolved. Id.
9. See Zimmerman v. Vill. of Skokie, 697 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(under the doctrine of stare decisis, the general policy of the courts is to stand by legal
precedents and not disturb settled points of law). Although not an inflexible rule,
given the long line of decisions enforcing reasonable restrictive covenants in the medical field, the doctrine of stare decisis dictates the guidelines for the debate over the
enforcement of medical restrictive covenants.
10. Image Supplies, Inc. v. Hilmert, 390 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting
TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 380 N.E.2d 963, 1004 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)).
11. Covenants seeking to prevent a person from engaging in a trade or business
within a proscribed area primarily arise either in employment relationships or ancillary to the sale of a business. See O'Sullivan v. Conrad, 358 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976). Since the interests to be protected differ significantly in those two situations, the courts apply different rules for adjudicating disputes relating to covenants in
each of those scenarios. Id. For purposes of this article, we will primarily address
medical restrictive covenants ancillary to an employment relationship.
12. Williams & Montgomery, Ltd. v. Stellato, 552 N.E.2d 1100, 1106 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (citing Am. Claims Serv. v. Boris, 485 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
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sary for the protection of a legitimate business interest and reasonable in duration and geographic scope,1 3 such covenants may
be enforced in Illinois. 14 One of the requirements for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant is the existence of an employer's protectable business interest.15 The most common
interest of an employer in enforcing a restrictive covenant is the
employer's interest in retaining its customers in circumstances
where the employee's contacts and relationships with those customers create a substantial risk that the employee will be able to
divert part or all of the employer's business.1 6 As one Illinois
court succinctly put it, an "employer has a valid interest in protecting its long-standing client relationships against the subter-

13. See Harlan Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625, 675 (1960) (a restraint is generally considered reasonable when its scope is necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the employer). See also Cent. Keystone Plating of Ill., Inc. v. Hutchinson, 210 N.E.2d 239, 241-42 (with respect to the geographic
scope of a restrictive covenant, it has generally been observed that "the employee
should be excluded only from territory in which... he was able to establish a certain
relationship with the employer's [former] customers"); Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. &
Health Care Serv., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (time restrictions
within restrictive covenants should correspond to the time the employer needs to acquire customers); Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 654 (I11.
App. Ct.
1989), and cases cited therein, (finding, without a detailed discussion of the rationale
for the specific duration and geographic scope, that Illinois courts have enforced medical restrictive covenants of five-years or longer covering areas involving a radius of
up to twenty-five miles); Wyatt v. Dishong, 469 N.E.2d 608, 610 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984)
(based upon the history of enforcement of medical restrictive covenants, a five-year,
ten mile covenant is "eminently reasonable"). But see House of Vision, Inc. v.
Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1967) (covenant prohibiting employee from engaging
in same or similar business within thirty miles from employer's offices for unlimited
duration was not reasonably necessary for protection of the employer).
14. See Office Mates 5, N. Shore v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080-81 (I11.
App. Ct.
1992). See also Schorr Paper Prod., Inc. v. Frary, 392 N.E.2d 1148, 1155 (I11.
App. Ct.
1979) ("In order for restrictive covenants in employment contracts to have anything
but a hollow meaning, they must be enforced where equitable.").
15. Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557 N.E.2d 357, 363 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990); McRand,
Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (I11.
App. Ct. 1985) ("One requirement for
the enforcement of a post-employment restrictive covenant is the existence of a protectable interest.").
16. Agrimerica, 557 N.E.2d at 363. A protectable interest can also arise in an
employment situation where the employee has acquired and tries to use trade secrets
or confidential information obtained from the employer. See Williams & Montgomery, 552 N.E.2d at 1106; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 188 (1979) ("The
employer's interest in exacting from his employee a promise not to compete after
termination of the employment is usually explained on the ground that the employer
has acquired either confidential trade information relating to some process or method
or the means to attract customers away from the employer."). In this article we will
not address that independent basis for enforcing restrictive covenants.
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fuge and sabotage of former employees. "17 Illinois courts apply
a two-prong test for determining whether an employer has a
protectable interest in its business relationships sufficient to enforce a restrictive covenant: (1) the employer must establish that
it has a near permanent relationship with its customers, and (2)
that, but for the association with the employer, the employee
would not have had contact with its customers. 8 In determining
whether an employer's relationships with its customers are near
permanent, Illinois courts generally consider a variety of objective factors: the length of the employer's relationship with its
customers; the amount of customer turnover; and the time, difficulty, and most importantly, cost of acquiring its customers.1 9
However, in some cases, where the type of business involved
clearly demonstrates either the existence of a near permanent
relationship or the lack thereof, Illinois courts have decided
whether to enforce restrictive covenants based solely upon the
nature of the employer's business.2 ° Pursuant to the "nature of
the business" approach, Illinois courts have held that a near permanent relationship is likely to exist in businesses involving professional or pseudo-professional services without resorting to a
cumbersome and fact intensive analysis of the objective factors
identified by the courts. 21 In addition to establishing a near per17. A-Tech Computer Serv., Inc. v. Soo Hoo, 627 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Il. App. Ct.
1993).
18. Agrimerica, 557 N.E.2d at 363 (citing McRand, 486 N.E.2d at 1311); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(citing Lee/O'Keefe Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1318 (I11.App. Ct.
1987)).
19. Agrimerica, 557 N.E.2d at 363 (the objective factors to be considered in determining whether a near-permanent relationship existed as follows: (1) the number of
years required to develop the clientele; (2) the amount of money invested to acquire
clients; (3) the degree of difficulty in acquiring clients; (4) the extent of personal contact by the employee; (5) the extent of the employer's knowledge of its clients; (6) the
duration of the customers' association with the employer; and (7) the continuity of the
employer-customer relationship). See also Office Mates 5, 599 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (applying the seven-factor test).
20. See Mileham, 620 N.E.2d at 490; Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human
Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). See Outsource Int'l, Inc. v.
Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1999) (it is now generally recognized that there are
two separate tests in Illinois for determining whether an employer has a near-permanent relationship with its customers: the seven factor test, and the "nature of the business" test).
21. See Dam, Snell & Taveirne, Ltd. v. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 469 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (employers engaged in a professional or pseudo-professional practice are more
likely to maintain near-permanent relationships with their client base); Williams &
Montgomery, 552 N.E.2d at 1106 (quoting Image Supplies, Inc. v. Hilmert, 390 N.E.2d
68, 70 (I11.App. Ct. 1979)) (recognizing that employers in certain professions could
justifiably anticipate a near-permanent relationship with their clientele). Compare
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manent relationship with its customers, an employer seeking to
enforce a restrictive covenant must also establish that, but for
his or her association with the employer, the employee would
not have come into contact with those customers. Thus, in circumstances where an employee is servicing substantially the
same customers as the employee serviced prior to joining the
employer, the Illinois courts have found that no protectable business interest exists to warrant enforcement of a restrictive
covenant.22
II.

MEDICAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN ILLINOIS.

Despite the specific rules which Illinois courts have developed
governing the enforcement of restrictive covenants, the Supreme Court of Illinois has consistently enforced the restrictive
covenants of medical practitioners without regard to the analysis
applied in other restrictive covenant cases. The Supreme Court
of Illinois first addressed medical restrictive covenants in Linn v.
Sigsbee.23
In Linn, Dr. Linn sold his medical practice to Dr. Sigsbee, and
Dr. Linn agreed not to establish or attempt to establish a medical practice in the same township or within six miles of the practice. Dr. Linn violated the agreement, and the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that an agreement not to practice medicine, if
reasonably limited and supported by consideration, is valid.24
The restraint in Dr. Linn's case, though unlimited in time, was
held to be reasonable and valid.25 In Ryan v. Hamilton, the Suwith Lawrence & Allen, 685 N.E.2d at 444 (a near-permanent relationship with customers has generally been found to be absent from businesses engaged in sales except
where unique products or services are involved); Office Mates 5, North Shore v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
22. See Jefco Labs., Inc. v. Carroo, 483 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that an employer does not have a protectable interest in customers that the employee brought to the employer). An argument looms regarding the interest of an
employer with respect to clients developed by the employee during the course of his
employment. See Com-Co Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Serv. Ins. Agency, Inc., 748 N.E.2d
298, 301 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). However, most courts are hesitant to enforce a restrictive covenant when the employee was primarily responsible for establishing the customer relationship. See LSBZ, Inc. v. Brokis, 603 N.E.2d 1240, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); Blake, supra note 13, at 667 ("Where the employer's role in securing or retaining customers is limited in relation to the employee's, it appears to be increasingly
likely that no protectable interest sufficient to support a restraining covenant will be
recognized.").
23. Linn, 1873 Ill. LEXIS 14 (Ill. 1873).
24. Id. at *7.
25. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d (1979) (regarding the issue of reasonableness of covenant restrictions, it has generally been held that
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preme Court of Illinois held that a similar covenant in the sale
of a medical practice was enforceable.26
Thereafter, in 1933, the Supreme Court held that a covenant
not to independently practice medicine in Chicago contained in
a partnership agreement was reasonable and valid. 27 The restrictive covenant of a partner was again found to be reasonable
and enforceable by the Supreme Court in Bauer v. Sawyer.2 8 In
1969, the Supreme Court of Illinois for the first time addressed
the enforcement of a physician's restrictive covenant in the employment context. In Canfield v. Spear,2 9 the court found that
Dr. Spear was a "newcomer" to the Rockford area in which the
plaintiff medical partnership practiced, and that it was "doubtless through the opportunities provided by this association that
he became known in the city." The court went on to observe
that Dr. Spear's agreement not to compete in Rockford or
within a 25-mile radius thereof for a period of three years following termination of his association with the partnership was
one of the considerations upon which the partnership accepted
him and provided him with a substantial income. Finding that
a restrictive covenant is overly broad if it covers a larger geographical area, type of
activity, or time span longer than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the
promise). See also supra note 14.
26. Ryan [need rest of case name], 68 N.E. 781, 786 (Ill. 1903).
27. Storer v. Brock, 184 N.E. 868, 870 (Ill. 1933).
28. Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. 1956) (the Illinois Supreme Court held
that there was no authority prohibiting members of a partnership from protecting
themselves against the competition of an outgoing partner because "such agreements
are classic illustrations of reasonable restraints of trade."). Although Illinois courts
have enforced partners' restrictive covenants over the years, the application of restrictive covenants outside the employment and sale of business situations may be problematic. Since there is no reason to presume that a partner will be provided with
confidential information or brought into contact with near-permanent relationships of
the partnership (the employee scenario), or that a partner will receive compensation
for the good will of the partnership in the event he withdraws (the sale of business
scenario), one could legitimately question whether a partnership necessarily has a legitimate interest in enforcing a restrictive covenant. The most common rationale, as
expressed in Bauer, is that partners can mutually agree to protect themselves against
the competition of an outgoing partner. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1979) (restrictive agreements of partners will be upheld,
where reasonable in scope, "in view of the interest of each party as promisee.").
However, Illinois courts have recognized that the right to contract can be subservient
to the public policy interests favoring free competition. See Hamer Holding Group,
Inc. v. Elmore, 613 N.E.2d 1190, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("[S]ociety prizes competition more highly than it does the ability of an individual to enter into private agreements, and ... when the two come into direct conflict, the interest of the individual
must give way to that of the many."). Accordingly, the rationale for enforcement of
restrictive covenants between partners needs further consideration.
29. Canfield, 254 N.E.2d 433, 433 (Ill. 1969).
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enforcement of Dr. Spear's covenant would not be injurious to
that the agreement
the public, 30 the Supreme Court concluded
31
was not contrary to public policy.
After Canfield, the Supreme Court of Illinois again upheld
the enforcement of a medical practitioner's restrictive covenant
in Cockerill v. Wilson.32 Cockerill involved a suit to enforce a
restrictive covenant not to practice veterinary medicine within a
radius of 30 miles of Dr. Cockerill's established practice for a
period of five years from the termination of Dr. Wilson's association. As in Canfield, the Supreme Court of Illinois recognized
that in bringing Dr. Wilson, a stranger to the area, into his medical practice, Dr. Cockerill was naturally interested in protecting
his clientele, which he had established over a period of years,
from being taken over by Dr. Wilson. The court held that "[t]he
asset is recognized as a legitimate interest of
protection of this
33
an employer.
Significantly, in both Canfield and Cockerill, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the restrictive covenants without any detailed consideration of the existence of a protectable interest of
the employer. The Supreme Court commented in Cockerill that
covenants "involving performances of professional services have
been held valid and enforceable when the limitations as to time
and territory are not unreasonable. ' 34 Failure to establish either
the prerequisite protectable interest of the employer, or to otherwise mention the near-permanency test utilized in other restrictive covenant cases has led other Illinois courts to hold that
a medical practitioner is presumed to have a sufficient protectable interest in his or her medical practice. Indeed, following
30. Id. at 435. (The court reasoned that, since it could not be said that the public
interest would be adversely affected if Dr. Spear decided to move from the community, no injury to the public interest results from such an agreement in advance). See
also Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1962) (holding that a physician "has always had the right to retire or move from the community. No one could
legally complain if he did.").
31. Id.
32. Cockerill v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 1972).
33. Id. at 651.
34. Id. at 650.
35. See, e.g., Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 653 (111. App. Ct.
1989); Gillespie v. Carbondale & Marion Eye Ctrs., Ltd., 622 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr. v. Perket, 605 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the restrictive covenant contained in the employment
agreement of its former director of physical medicine and rehabilitation "was more
nearly like that of the professionals in Cockerill and Canfield and the showing of a
proper protectable interest was inherent in the relationships alleged in the
complaint.").
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the long line of Supreme Court decisions enforcing medical restrictive covenants, one appellate court observed that:
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld covenants
not-to-compete in medical practice cases without making specific inquiry into whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a protectable business interest. Notwithstanding the appellate court
decisions which have carefully scrutinized whether the plaintiff
has shown a protectable interest in cases outside the medical
practice area, the Illinois Supreme Court's consistent enforcement of such covenants in the medical professional field,
where the duration and geographic scope is reasonable, demonstrates its recognition that a professional's medical practice
is a protectable business interest.36
Although not irrebutable, 37 the presumption that a physician has
a protectable business interest in his or her professional practice
provides a strong foundation for the enforcement of medical
practitioners' restrictive covenants.
36. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d at 653. This rule goes a step beyond the "nature of the
business" analysis applied by some courts to determine whether an employer has a
near-permanent relationship with its customers. See supra notes 20 and 21. In cases
invoking the "nature of the business" test, the employer is still required to establish
that, but for the employee's association with the employer, he or she would not have
come into contact with those customers. See Springfield Rare Coins Galleries, Inc. v.
Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479, 489 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) ("Where the employer is engaged
in the provision of professional services and employs the employee to assist in the
provision of those services, and the evidence indicates the employee would not have
had contact with the clients but for the association with the employer, the near-permanency test is satisfied."); Lawrence & Allen v. Cambridge Human Res. Group,
Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 443-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). Failure to include the second prong
of the near-permanency test could have a significant and unintended impact where,
for example, an employer attempts to enforce a restrictive covenant against a physician who had an established patient base prior to joining the employer. The employer
should not have a legitimate business interest in preventing a physician from treating
patients post-employment whom the physician had treated prior to joining the employer. See Blake, supra note 13, at 663-64. ("When an employee ... actually brings
customers with him when he takes employment, courts are reluctant to prevent his
soliciting them when he departs, regardless of the existence of a covenant not to
compete.").
37. See Danville Polyclinic, Ltd. v. Dethmers, 631 N.E.2d 842, 845-46 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (no protectable interest exists where covenant was not to protect employer's
relationship with patients, but to keep defendant associated with employer to help
finance construction of a new building); S. Ill. Med. Bus. Assoc. v. Camillo, 546
N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (medical laboratory group did not have protectable interest in enforcing covenant of employee who developed relationships through
his own efforts); Taimoorazy v. Bloomington Anesthesiology Serv., Ltd.,122 F. Supp.
2d 967, 980 (C.D. 111. 2000) (anesthesiology group did not have protectable interest in
stopping plaintiff from practicing at hospital where the group did not and could not
practice).
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However, the Supreme Court of Illinois has not opined on the
enforcement of medical restrictive covenants since its decision
in Cockerill thirty years ago.38 Prior to the Cockerill decision,
health care services were primarily provided on a fee for service
basis. However, a year after the Cockerill decision, the passage
of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (the
"HMO Act") 39 heralded a new form of health care delivery system, the HMO.4 ° The Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized
that this new health care model dramatically alters the manner
in which health care services are provided in the post-Cockerill
era.

41

Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of discussion regarding how the dramatic changes in the health care delivery system
have affected the validity of medical practitioners' restrictive
covenants. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Canfield and Cockerill were predicated upon the development
of a traditional physician-patient relationship. However, given
the advent of managed care and, in particular, HMOs, where a
patient's relationship with a physician is ordinarily governed by
the contractual agreement between the patient's employer and
the managed care entity, and the contractual relationship between the managed care entity and its member providers, there
38. But see Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ill.
1997) (though the Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to declare a physician's restrictive covenant unenforceable, the decision turned on whether enforcement of the covenant was barred under the "corporate practice of medicine" doctrine. The Supreme
Court concluded that the health center, which was duly licensed under Illinois' Hospital Licensing Act, had the authority to practice medicine, and was therefore excepted
from the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Id. at 114 (because the circuit court
had not addressed the substantive issues of the case, the Supreme Court did not rule
upon the validity of the restrictive covenant). Id. See also Carter-Shields, infra notes
47 and 48 (where the Supreme Court refused to address the validity of medical restrictive covenants and instead held that the unlicensed, not-for-profit employer in
that case was not privy to the exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
carved out in Berlin).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(a)-(d) (2002).
40. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4644 (2002).
41. See Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000)
("HMOs undertake an expansive role in arranging for and providing health care services to their members."). See also Berlin, 688 N.E.2d at 114 ("[W]e believe that
extensive changes in the health care industry since the time of the Kerner decision,
including the emergence of corporate health maintenance organizations. . .have
greatly altered the concern over the commercialization of health care."); Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000) (the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that HMOs change the financial incentives of health care providers, encouraging physicians to provide less care in order to control costs and improve the financial performance of the HMO).
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is a legitimate basis for questioning the historical justification for
enforcing medical restrictive covenants in this new era of health
care delivery.
Despite the genesis of the formation of the physician-patient
relationship, the ultimate responsibility for patient care resides
in the physician. 42 Thus, even in this new era of health care delivery, it appears that a medical practitioner develops a sufficiently close relationship with patients to warrant protection of
those relationships through a reasonable restrictive covenant.
However, close scrutiny is needed to assure that the historical
foundation for the enforcement of such covenants is appropriately utilized to protect a legitimate business interest, as opposed to merely restricting competition, in the modern postCockerill health care delivery system.
III.

CARTER-SHIELDS DECLARES MEDICAL RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS VOID.

The strong historical foundation for the enforcement of medical restrictive covenants in Illinois has been called into question
as a result of the Supreme Court of Illinois' promulgation of a
rule of professional conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from offering or making a partnership or employment agreement which
restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of
the relationship.43 Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6
took effect on August 1, 1990. In Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v.
Gleason,44 the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that Rule
5.6, which is designed to afford clients greater freedom in choosing counsel and to protect lawyers from onerous conditions that
would unduly limit their mobility, retroactively prohibited en45
forcement of a lawyer's non-competition agreement.
Shortly after Rule 5.6 took effect, at least one Illinois court
questioned whether the prohibition against lawyers entering
into restrictive agreements should logically be extended to physicians. 46 However, not until the appellate court's decision in
Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst. in December 2000, did any
42. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229-30.
43. IL. SuP. CT. R.P.C. 5.6(a).
44. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 369 (Ill. 1998).
45. Id. at 370.
46. See Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
("If attorneys are precluded from entering into [restrictive covenants], the same prohibition should arguably be extended to other holders of professional licenses.").
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Illinois court ever purport to broadly invalidate physician restrictive covenants on public policy grounds.47
Carter-Shields involved a physician who had practiced
medicine for 12 years before entering into an agreement with
Alton Health Institute ("AHI"), a not-for-profit health care organization. The agreement included a two-year non-competition provision.48 Less then two years after her employment with
AHI began, Dr. Carter-Shields filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have her agreement with AHI, including the
non-competition provision, declared invalid.49 The trial court
found that Dr. Carter-Shields' employment agreement was valid
and enforceable, and enjoined 50her from practicing medicine
within a 20-mile radius of AHI.
On appeal, the Fifth District Appellate Court in CarterShields first considered whether AHI was precluded from enforcing the restrictive covenant by the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine. 1 Illinois courts have long held that, unless
otherwise permitted by the legislature, corporations are prohibited from providing professional medical services.52 However,
in the Berlin case, the Illinois Supreme Court carved out an exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine for licensed hospitals. 53 The appellate court in Carter-Shieldsinitially
held that AHI, because of its status as a not-for-profit health
care corporation, did not come within the narrow exception to
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine created for licensed
hospitals by Berlin.5 4 Because AHI was not authorized to prac47. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (I11.
App. Ct. 2000).
48. Id. at 571. The trial court in Carter-Shields had modified its interpretation of
the 20-mile radius covered by the non-competition clause to "reflect driving distance
instead of a straight line on a map." Id. at 573. Although few cases have discussed
the proper method of measuring a radial restrictive covenant, the more considered
approach is to measure the radius as a straight line. See Scuitier v. Barile, 70 A.2d.
894, 895 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950) (citing Johnson v. McIntyre, 309 Pa. 191 (Pa. 1932))
("Radius's standing alone is defined as a straight line extending from the center of a
circle to its circumference. It would, therefore, seem that by definition a radius could
not turn corners or follow curves. If the area in a restrictive covenant is expressed by
use of the word 'radius,' the prescribed distance should be measured along a direct
line. If the parties intend otherwise, it should be clearly expressed.").
49. Id. at 572.
50. Id. at 572-73.
51. Id. at 573.
52. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 110-11 (I11.
1997) (discussion of the history of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
53. Id. at 106. See also supra note 38.
54. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
("We are unconvinced by defendants' arguments that the corporate practice of
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tice medicine, the appellate court concluded that the contract
between AHI and Dr. Carter-Shields, including the non-competition provision, was void.
Thereafter, "[a]ssuming arguendo that Berlin applies to the
facts of the instant case," the appellate court in Carter-Shields
went on to consider whether AHI had a legitimate business interest in enforcing the non-competition provision in any event.
Finding that Dr. Carter-Shields had "basically started a new business for AHI," the appellate court concluded that there was
"no showing that AHI had a near-permanent relationship with
any of plaintiff's patients. ' 56 In so holding, the appellate court
specifically found that "[t]his is not a case where a physician
takes on a newcomer and the newwith an established practice 57
comer usurps the clientele.
Finally, the appellate court in Carter-Shieldsnoted that a 1986
Opinion of the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs ("Opinions") "discourage[d] any agreement between physicians which restricts the right of a physician
to practice medicine for a specified period of time or in a specified area upon termination of employment or a partnership or a
corporate agreement."58 The appellate court further observed
that in Dowd & Dowd, the Supreme Court relied upon Rule 5.6
of the Code of Professional Conduct to determine that noncompetition provisions among lawyers were void and unenforceable.5 9 Finding that Section 9.2 of the AMA's Opinions and
Rule 5.6 were similar in scope, and that the same public policy
arguments that prohibited lawyers from making non-competition agreements were applicable to physicians, the appellate
court in Carter-Shieldsheld that Dr. Carter-Shields' restrictive
covenant was unenforceable on public policy grounds.60
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling that AHI was prohibited from practicing medicine under the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 61 Having determined
medicine doctrine does not apply to AHI. Berlin was limited to only licensed hospitals, and we decline to extend the holding in Berlin to AHI or any similar health care
provider.").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 576.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing section 9.2 of the Opinions of the Council on Ethical & Judicial
Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n (1986)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 577.
61. Carter-Shields, No. 90767, 2002 WL 31087256, at *11 (I11.
2002).
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that the contract between Dr. Carter-Shields and AHI was void,
the court expressed "no opinion with respect to the general validity of non-competition
clauses contained within physician em62
ployment agreements.
IV.

PRAIRIE EYE CENTER REJECTS CARTER-SHIELDS.

The public policy holding of the appellate court in CarterShields called into question the long line of decisions in Illinois
enforcing reasonable medical restrictive covenants.63 Not only
did the Carter-Shieldsdecision represent a complete reversal of
the more than one hundred years of Supreme Court authority
enforcing medical restrictive covenants in Illinois, but it also was
contrary to the weight of authority from other jurisdictions holding that reasonable restrictive covenants of medical practitioners
are not per se unenforceable. 64 Indeed, as the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania recently observed, "no jurisdiction has recognized
62. Id. However, the Supreme Court found that the portion of the Fifth District
Appellate Court's opinion holding that physician restrictive covenants are unenforceable as a matter of public policy was wholly advisory. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court vacated that portion of the decision. Consequently, the entire appellate court
discussion of its public policy concerns regarding the enforcement of medical restrictive covenants has been nullified by the Supreme Court, and that discussion no longer
has precedential value in the debate over medical restrictive covenants. See People v.
Eidel, 745 N.E.2d 736, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sogol,
724 N.E.2d 105, 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)) (holding that vacated judgment is void and
"vacatur returns parties to status quo ante, as though ...judgment had never been
entered.").
63. See discussion supra Section II.
64. E.g., Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
("Today, the weight of authority holds that reasonable covenants not to compete after
termination of employment entered into between physicians are enforceable."). See
also Duneland Emergency Physician's Med. Group, P.C. v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963,
966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1153 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997)) ("[N]on-compete covenants which restrict medical services in a particular
area are not void per se as against public policy"); Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112
N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1962) (finding that the public has no vested right to the services of the covenantee); Hall v. Willard & Woolsley, P.C., 471 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Ky.
1971) (policy of State is to enforce covenants, including those involving professional
services, unless serious inequities would result); Middlesex Neurological Assocs., Inc.
v. Cohen, 324 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Mass. 1975) (though not deciding whether restrictive
covenants in medical employment contracts are invalid per se; the court declared that
the "tendency of the authority seems to the contrary."); Armstrong v. Cape Girardeau Physician Assocs., 49 S.W.3d 821, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) ("Missouri has no per
se rule against enforcing covenants not to compete between medical practitioners.")
(citing William v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Mo. 1973); Hansen v. Edwards, 426
P.2d 792, 793 (Nev. 1967) ("The medical profession is not exempt from a restrictive
covenant ..."); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1168 (N.J. 1978) ("[W]e do not
find restrictive covenants between physicians to be Per se unreasonable and unenforceable."); Concord Orthopaedics Prof'l Ass'n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1275 (N.H.
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a public interest in assuring the unrestricted ability of a particular patient in continuity of care with a single physician. "65 Although several states' legislatures have either declared medical
restrictive covenants unenforceable 66 or have provided that all
restraints of trade are void, 67 the Carter-Shields decision was
unique in that a court was declaring the entire field
of medical
68
restrictive covenants void as against public policy.
While the Carter-Shields case was pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois, the Fourth District Appellate Court
rendered its decision in PrairieEye Ctr. expressly rejecting the
69 In PrairieEye Ctr., the
public policy holding in Carter-Shields.
court considered a two-year, ten-mile restrictive covenant of Dr.
Butler, an ophthalmologist. 70 After the trial court entered a final injunction against Dr. Butler, 71 as well as awarding substantial damages for his breaches of the covenant and of the
preliminary injunction, Dr. Butler, relying on Carter-Shields,ar1997) (traditional test of reasonableness to determine whether a covenant is enforceable applies to physicians).
65. W. Penn Specialty MSO, Inc. v. Nolan, 737 A.2d 295, 301 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999). However, some courts have refused to rule out the possibility that medical
restrictive covenants are per se unenforceable, leaving the issue open. See Valley
Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Ariz. 1999) (finding the covenant at
issue unreasonable and thus unenforceable, the court did not find need to address the
contention that restrictive covenants are void per se as against public policy); Med.
Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Tenn., 19 S.W.3d 803, 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ("We express no opinion whether the public's interest would mandate enforcement or nonenforcement of a covenant not to compete involving a physician's leaving his private
practice group to compete against that private practice group."); Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1282-83. (The court held that, in light of the great public policy interest involved in covenants not to compete between physicians, "the interests of the
public may outweigh the protectable interests of the [employer].").
66. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (1999).
Any covenant not to compete provision of an employment, partnership or
corporate agreement between and/or among physicians which restricts the
right of a physician to practice medicine in a particular locale and/or for a
defined period of time, upon the termination of the principal agreement of
which such provision is a part, shall be void ....
However, the Delaware provision does allow the enforcement of covenant not to
compete provisions that require the payment of damages). Id. See also Paula Berg,
Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians: Protecting
Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1992) (discussing various state statutes relating to medical restrictive covenants, or general restraint
of trade legislation).
67. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (1997).
68. See supra notes 61-62.
69. Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
70. Id.
71. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 713 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(affirming preliminary injunction).
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gued that his restrictive covenant was unenforceable on public
policy grounds.72 The PrairieEye Ctr. court rejected that argument and declined to follow Carter-Shields,noting that in Dowd,
the court relied on Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 73 , which prohibits lawyers from participating in any employment agreement restricting the rights of lawyers to practice
after termination of an employment agreement. Finding the
non-competition agreement void and unenforceable, the court
stated the rule was designed to further the public policy objective of affording clients freedom in choosing counsel as well as
to protect lawyers from conditions unduly restricting their mobility. 74 In Carter-Shields,the court relied on Section 9.2 of the
Opinions of the Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Ass'n. (1986), which states non-competition
agreements between physicians are discouraged as not in the
public interest.75
While Rule 5.6 and Section 9.2 may share some of the same
public policy concerns, they have different applicability when
considered here.
First, the wording of Rule 5.6 is mandatory while that in Section 9.2 is advisory only. Of more importance, Rule 5.6 is codified in the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court and has the force
of law;76 also, it is indicative of public policy in the area of attorney conduct. Section 9.2, on the other hand, is not codified in
77
the State of Illinois; thus, it does not establish public policy.
While there may be no real difference in the concerns of clients
in keeping or choosing lawyers of their own choice and patients
in keeping or choosing doctors of their own choice, a distinct
difference lies in the legal underpinnings of Dowd and CarterShields. Despite our sympathy for the rights of patients to
choose their own doctors, we are constrained to follow the long
line of precedent finding non-competition agreements enforcea-

72. Prairie Eye Ctr., 768 N.E.2d at 416.
73. IL. RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT, ART. VIII, R. 5.6 (2002).
74. Prairie Eye Ctr., 713 N.E.2d at 612 (citing Dowd, 693 N.E.2d at 369).
75. Carter-Shields, 739 N.E.2d 569, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
76. In re Vrdolyak, 560 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Ill. 1990).
77. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Illinois, 529 N.E.2d 534,
540 (Ill. 1988).
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ble in the medical profession.7 8 We leave the public policy pronouncements for either our supreme court or the legislature.79
On the surface, the appellate court decisions in Carter-Shields
and PrairieEye Ctr. seem diametrically opposed to each other.
However, those decisions are not entirely incompatible in light
of the prior precedent in Illinois regarding medical restrictive
covenants. Although such covenants have enjoyed a special
heritage that has led to a presumption of the existence of a protectable interest, 80 that presumption has not been treated as irrebutable. In fact, when the basis for the presumption of a
protectable interest has been shown not to apply, the Illinois
courts have refused to enforce medical restrictive covenants.8 1
The Carter-Shieldscase involved the employment of an experienced medical professional who apparently did not need or use
his employer's reputation or good will to develop her medical
practice. In such a case, the theoretical underpinnings for enforcement of a restrictive covenant are not present. In that situation, it would violate the public policy of Illinois to allow the
employer to interfere in an employee's ability to practice his or
her profession when no legitimate interest of the employer
would warrant such a result. To that extent, the appellate
court's decision in Carter-Shields is perfectly in accord with prior
precedent.
V.

EVALUATING THE PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS IN
CARTER-SHIELDS.

It is in the alternate ruling of Carter-Shields suggesting that
medical restrictive covenants are per se contrary to public policy
that the Fifth District strayed from prior precedent in Illinois,82
as well as from other jurisdictions.83 Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court of Illinois vacated that portion of the CarterShields decision, the underlying policy issues raised in the opinion must eventually be addressed.84 Consideration of the bases
78. Canfield v. Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1969); Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329
(111. 1956); Gillespie v. Carbondale & Marion Eye Ctrs., Ltd., 622 N.E.2d 1267 (11.
App. Ct. 1993); Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
79. Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
80. See supra text accompanying note 37.
81. See supra text accompanying note 38.
82. See supra Section II.
83. See supra note 58.
84. The Supreme Court of Illinois is currently considering a petition for leave to
appeal in the PrairieEye Center case. Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414,
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for the Carter-Shields decision leads to the conclusion that the
broad public policy pronouncement in the now vacated portion
of that decision was not supported.
Initially, the Carter-Shields decision pointed out that the
American Medical Association (AMA) disfavors the use of any
restrictive covenant in either an employment or partnership
agreement among physicians.85 However, "[f]or the past 60
years, the AMA has consistently taken the position that noncompetition agreements between physicians impact negatively
on patient care. '86 Since 1933, Illinois courts could have looked
to the AMA and found that restrictive covenants are, to varying
degrees, discouraged. 7 Nevertheless, as discussed above, the
Illinois courts have routinely enforced reasonable restrictive
covenants of medical practitioners. Because the AMA's ethical
opinion is only a guide to professional behavior,88 several courts
have refused to declare medical restrictive covenants unenforceable on the basis of the AMA's non-binding guidance. 89 Most
importantly, as recognized in Prairie Eye Ctr., the AMA does
not establish the public policy of Illinois. 90 Accordingly, Section
9.02 of the AMA's Opinions does not support the sweeping prohibition of medical restrictive covenants suggested by the appellate court in Carter-Shields.91
414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), rehearingdenied (May 17, 2002), appeal pending (Ill. App. Ct.
2002).
85. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 576 (I1. App. Ct. 2000).
86. Berg, supra note 66, at 6.
87. See id. at 6-9.
88. See Andrea Cooper, Restrictive Covenants, 242 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 3091
(1982).
89. Prairie Eye Ctr. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 420 (11. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that
Section 9.2 of the AMA Opinions is "advisory only"); Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 594
N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Oh. App. Ct. 1991) (observing that AMA only "discourages" restrictive covenants among physicians, and that Section 9.02 of the Current Opinions
"does not support the conclusion that the AMA intended to ban all such covenants.");
Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Ariz. 1999) (noting that the
AMA does not ban restrictive covenants but discourages them). But see Berg, supra
note 66, at 8-9 (suggesting that the AMA was reluctant to adopt an outright ban on
restrictive covenants because of concerns about possible violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act).
90. Prairie Eye Ctr., 768 N.E.2d at 420. See also Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d
1161, 1168 (N.J. 1978) (hesitating to afford significant weight to those pronouncements of private professional organizations which have not been adopted by any governmental body or court).
91. See First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 674 N.E.2d
481, 485 (I1. App. Ct. 1996) (finding it "clear that the Illinois State Bar Association
does not express the public policy of the State of Illinois.").
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The appellate court in Carter-Shieldsalso based its conclusion
that medical restrictive covenants are contrary to public policy
upon the ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Dowd &
Dowd. The Dowd court looked to Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to conclude that restrictive covenants are not
enforceable between lawyers.9 a Although the Supreme Court of
Illinois, in its capacity as the governing body for attorneys,93 has
made a bright line rule prohibiting restrictive covenants for lawyers, 94 neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court has announced a similar public policy foundation for extending that
prohibition to physicians.
Accordingly, the rule prohibiting
lawyers from entering into restrictive covenants does not, in and
of itself, justify a sweeping prohibition of restrictive covenants
for physicians.
Finally, the appellate court in Carter-Shields found that an
agreement restricting the right of a physician to practice
medicine not only limits the physician's autonomy, but also interferes in the patient's freedom to choose a doctor. 96 Observing that free choice of physicians is the right of every individual,
the appellate court in Carter-Shieldsconcluded that the restrictive covenant of Dr. Carter-Shields was unenforceable on public
policy grounds.97 However, that argument had been previously
rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court, which recognized that
since a patient's right to freely choose a physician did not prohibit the physician from voluntarily retiring or leaving the com92. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 576-77 (111. App. Ct.
2000).
93. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 708 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ill. 1988)).
94. IL. RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCr, ART. VIII, R. 5.6 (2002).
95. See Prairie Eye Ctr., 768 N.E.2d at 421 (leaving public policy pronouncements
for either the state supreme court or the legislature); see also Ohio Urology, Inc. v.
Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) (finding that, unlike disciplinary
rules expressly prohibiting restrictive covenants among lawyers, the ethical standards
pertaining to physicians do not mandate unenforceability); Karlin v. Scheinmen, 390
N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1979) (observing that regulations governing physicians do not contain restrictions similar to disciplinary rule forbidding attorneys from
entering into restrictive covenants).
96. Carter-Shields, 739 N.E.2d at 577.
97. Id. (Citing Michael R. Sullivan, Covenants Not to Compete and Liquidated
Damage Clauses: Diagnosis and Treatment for Physicians, 46 S.C.L. REV. 505, 514
(1995)) (referring to section 9.02 of the Opinions of the Council on Ethical & Judicial
Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n (1982)). Interestingly, the treatise cited in CarterShields immediately followed the quoted section by stating, "[h]owever, AMA opinions are merely advisory and do not bind members of the association. In fact, the
general counsel of the AMA suggests that most states will enforce such restraints if
reasonable." Id. (Note omitted).
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munity, a physician's voluntary covenant to practice outside a

specified area did not violate public policy. 98 That position is
consistent with the unanimous weight of authority from other
jurisdictions. 99

Indeed, the enforcement of medical restrictive covenants
could be supported on several public policy grounds. 10 0 First,
such covenants could actually enhance stability in patient relationships with physicians. The premise of a valid medical restrictive covenant is that the employer has a near-permanent
relationship with its patients.' 0 Thus, in the appropriate circumstances envisioned for the enforcement of medical restrictive
covenants, it was not the choice of the patient to establish a relationship with an employed physician, but that of the employer
who brought the physician into an existing medical practice and
into contact with existing physician-patients' relationships.
Accordingly, when applied properly, 10 2 a medical restrictive

covenant should actually preserve the long-standing relationship

98. See supra note 31.
99. See supra notes 62-63.
100. It is not our intention to decide the public policy debate. We are merely
suggesting that the public policy issue requires significantly more analysis than was
provided by the appellate court in Carter-Shields before such an important and complex decision is made. As the Supreme Court has recognized in Pegram v. Herdrich,
530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000), in the health care field, "such complicated factfinding and
such a debatable judgment are not wisely required of courts unless for some reason
resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social value .... " By suggesting policy considerations beyond the "freedom of patient choice" versus "freedom of contract"
debate, we agree with the Supreme Court that the "very difficulty of these policy
considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate,
suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable." Id. at 222. Indeed, in
1999, a proposed amendment to the Medical Practice Act of 1987 prohibiting physicians from entering into restrictive covenants was introduced in the Illinois Senate. S.
925, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (I11.1999). No action was taken on that bill.
101. See, e.g., Canfield, 254 N.E.2d 433, 434 (I11.1969). That reasoning has been
extended to cover the referral sources of a medical practice. See Retina Servs., Ltd. v.
Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). In any event, the question of a
patient's right to choose a physician is not an issue in a referral situation.
102. Because the existence of a near-permanent relationship between an existing
medical practice and its patients can be rebutted, the courts can and should avoid
enforcing restrictive covenants when they do not protect a legitimate interest of the
employers. See supra note 38. Indeed, because the facts apparently disclosed that the
employer did not have a protectable interest in existing relationships with its patients
in Carter-Shields,the appellate court decision was warranted on that ground alone,
without invalidating all medical restrictive covenants. Carter-Shields v. Alton Health
Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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of the patient with a medical practice. °3 Absent such a covenant, an employed physician might establish a separate practice
and begin competing for the business of the patients, who would
be forced to decide between the employer, with whom the patient had a long-standing relationship, and the departing physician. The restrictive covenant would encourage the physician to
remain with the employer, thus preserving the patients' relationships both with the physician and the practice. 0 4
The destabilizing effect of declaring all medical restrictive
covenants unenforceable is particularly acute, because the prohibition against medical restrictive covenants suggested by the
appellate court in Carter-Shields seems to apply equally to restrictive covenants between medical partners. 0 5 Without such
covenants, medical partners would be emboldened to dissolve
their partnerships and begin competing with their former partners. Such a result would cause precisely the dislocations in the
continuity of care asserted as a basis against the enforcement of
0 6
medical restrictive covenants.
Not only would broadly prohibiting medical restrictive covenants likely result in significant turmoil as employees and partners began competing against their former practices, but such a
prohibition would also interfere in the manner in which employers deploy their manpower. Thus, restrictive covenants may ac103. Cockerill v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 648, 648 (Ill. 1972) (holding that because of
the defendant's contact with a clientele the plaintiff had established, the plaintiff was
naturally interested in protecting his clients from being taken over by defendant).
104. See Blake, supra note 13, at 657. (Observing that a covenant not to compete
"may deter the employee from leaving his employment and thus from finding himself
in a position to compete for customers.").
105. The reasons cited by the appellate court in Carter-Shields for invalidating
that employment covenant on public policy grounds are equally applicable to covenants made by partners in a medical practice. Carter-Shields, 739 N.E.2d at 577. The
AMA's position discouraging restrictive covenants for physicians specifically refers to
partnership (or corporate) agreements, as well as those of employees. See AMA
Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Op.E-9.02 (1998), available at http://www.amaassn.org. In addition, the patient's right of free choice of physician relied upon by the
Carter-Shields court would apply regardless of the form of the relationship between
the physician and its employer/partners. Finally, the Rules of Professional Conduct
for attorneys expressly prohibits partnership agreements, as well as employment
agreements, restricting the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship. IL. RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT, ART. VIII, R. 5.6 (2002), available at
http://www.state.il.us/court/Supremecourt/Rules/ArtVIII/ArtVIII.htm. Accordingly,
if the reasoning of the appellate court Carter-Shields is adopted, then partnership restrictive covenants of medical practitioners should also be unenforceable as contrary
to public policy.
106. See Berg, supra note 66, at 31. (Contending that continuity in the doctorpatient relationship fosters the delivery of quality health care).
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tually increase efficiency by encouraging an employer to entrust
information to an employee. 107 The same is true with respect to
patient relationships. If medical restrictive covenants were prohibited, then employers would be encouraged to manipulate the
manner in which employed physicians are utilized in an attempt
to preserve the employer's relationship with patients. Alternatively, employers would be encouraged to simply hire fewer employees. In either event, the likely result is that the public
would end 8up with less than optimal access to employed
10
physicians.
Finally, the prohibition against medical restrictive covenants
suggested by the appellate court's decision in Carter-Shields
would open the floodgates to other professionals seeking relief
from their covenants on public policy grounds. Extension of the
prohibition against restrictive covenants among lawyers to physicians would logically require the further extension of that prohibition to other professionals, such as accountants. 10 9
However, Illinois courts have routinely enforced reasonable restrictive covenants of accounting professionals.' 10 Accordingly,
the public policy debate cannot be limited to only physicians,
but must, necessarily, consider the effects of prohibiting restrictive covenants in all professional fields, including accounting.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Illinois' failure to resolve the public
policy debate in the Carter-Shields case leaves medical practitioners and their lawyers guessing at the direction that the Illinois courts will go with respect to the enforcement of medical
restrictive covenants. However, the basis for determining the
future of such covenants can be determined by looking to the
past precedent relating to medical restrictive covenants. By fol107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (2002).
108. See Blake, supra note 13, at 652. (Reciting the argument that, "[u]nless some
enforceable commitment or effective deterrent is possible, employers will not be justified in making the optimum outlay on employee-training programs.").
109. See Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition
Clauses in ProfessionalPartnershipAgreements of Accountants, Physiciansand Attorneys, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 32-33 (1993) (suggesting that, since clients or patients of an
accountant or physician have as strong an interest in freedom of choice as a lawyer's
client, the complete prohibition against enforcement of the restrictive covenants of
lawyers is inappropriate, and instead, all professional covenants should be held enforceable through reasonable financial forfeiture provisions).
110. See Dam, Snell & Tavierne v. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 471 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001); Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 366 N.E.2d 603, 606 (I11.App. Ct. 1977).
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lowing that precedent, the Supreme Court of Illinois can reconcile the conflicting appellate court decisions by enforcing
medical restrictive covenants only when the nature of the employment relationship supports the existence of a protectable
business interest. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois must
recognize that the public policy debate has not provided a sufficiently strong reason for it to overturn its consistent enforcement of reasonable medical restrictive covenants. Instead, the
Supreme Court of Illinois should reject the argument raised by
the appellate court in Carter-Shieldsthat medical restrictive covenants are void as contrary to public policy and continue to recognize the special heritage of medical restrictive covenants
under Illinois law. Given the complexity of the public policy issues involved in evaluating whether or not to enforce restrictive
covenants in the medical field, any such decision should be left
to the legislature.
However, until such time as the Supreme Court of Illinois
conclusively resolves the public policy debate, which it refused
to do in the Carter-Shields case, medical professionals are cautioned from placing excessive reliance upon restrictive covenants of their employees or partners. Particular attention
should be paid to determine whether the presumption of a nearpermanent relationship, which the Illinois courts have applied to
medical practitioners, is well-founded in their case. Indeed, until the public policy issues are resolved, it is reasonable to assume that lower courts in Illinois will look carefully to
determine whether a medical restrictive covenant should be invalidated on other grounds. For that reason, we call upon the
Supreme Court of Illinois to reaffirm the validity of medical restrictive covenants and confirm the proper use of such covenants
within the business of the practice of medicine in the State of
Illinois.
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